Which is exactly what GCHQ is looking to reverse. They absolutely do this already, but so far they've done really well at the "storing it" part and not so well at the "breaking it" part - so, again, we're back to GCHQ pushing for backdoors as per the article. No, the easy solution is to force the addition of a government-held key - hence the reason GCHQ is suggesting it. Clarification point: browser encryption (in fact, all encryption technology developed in the US) was weak only for international users: US users got to use full-strength cryptography, whereas international users were restricted to half-size "export ciphers" under, amazingly, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Source: I used to have to use a version of PGP that was written in the US, had its source code printed as a book so that it would be covered under First Amendment protections for free speech, exported, scanned, OCRed, and compiled. Man, that was a weird time.